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In a recently published article we examined the relationship between 
demography, institutions, and economic growth in early modern Europe 
(Dennison and Ogilvie 2014), focussing on recent claims that the European 
Marriage Pattern (EMP) was the institution that caused European economic 
growth. Analyzing 4,705 observations of demographic behavior for 39 
countries, we found no evidence for the claimed relationship, nor any 
empirical support for the idea that the EMP improved female autonomy, 
increased human capital investment, enhanced demographic 
responsiveness to economic conditions, or created growth-inducing cultural 
norms. The institutional sources of economic growth, we concluded, 
resided in nonfamilial institutions, which differed across societies, not in 
the EMP, which was shared by fast- and slow-growing economies alike. 
Carmichael, de Pleijt, van Zanden, and De Moor (CPZM), although 
agreeing with our broader conclusions about the significance of underlying 
nonfamilial institutional arrangements, criticize our findings. This article 
refutes their criticisms, and elaborates our arguments concerning the 
relationship between institutions, demography and growth.  
INSTITUTIONS 
We have long argued that institutions influence economic outcomes 
(Ogilvie 2001, 2003, 2011; Dennison and Ogilvie 2007; Dennison 2011a, 
2011b, 2013). However, the key institution favoring economic growth in 
Europe cannot have been the family system (Dennison and Ogilvie 2014, 
pp. 673–80, 684–87). Observing an institution in a successful economy 
does not necessarily imply a causal relationship: the institution may be 
present because of the economy’s success, or the successful economy may 
perform well for other underlying reasons, despite, rather than because of, 
any specific institution. To identify which institutions contribute to success 
in successful economies, and which do not, requires careful empirical 
investigation.  
In order to provide institutional explanations for economic growth, 
we need to identify institutional differences between slow- and fast-
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growing economies. The EMP, we argue, was not one of these differences. 
The EMP was associated with rapid growth in some early modern 
economies, such as England and the Netherlands, but with slow growth in 
others, including Scandinavia, Germany, Austria, and Bohemia (Dennison 
and Ogilvie 2014, pp. 659–72). The economic success of England and the 
Netherlands cannot be explained in terms of a phenomenon that they 
shared with many other economies that grew much more slowly. 
CPZM criticize us for failing to acknowledge that the 
characteristics of the EMP were “outcome variables that change with the 
changing nature of economic circumstances.” In fact, we point out the 
endogeneity of demographic decisions repeatedly in our article (Dennison 
and Ogilvie 2014, pp. 672–73, 677). That institutions, such as marriage 
systems, are embedded in larger institutional frameworks is something we 
have long emphasized (Dennison 2011a, 2011b, 2013; Ogilvie 2007; 
Ogilvie and Carus 2014). However, the institutional frameworks in which 
the EMP was embedded were not ones that invariably facilitated economic 
growth (Dennison and Ogilvie 2014, pp. 673–77, 684–87). Available 
scholarship suggests, and CPZM themselves acknowledge, that the 
demographic practices highlighted in the EMP required a framework of 
strong nonfamilial institutions that could substitute for the labor, insurance, 
and welfare services that families could not provide when marriage was 
non-universal and households small. But such nonfamilial institutions were 
not always ones that favored economic growth. In some cases, they 
included “generalized” institutions, such as relatively impartial states and 
reasonably well-functioning factor and product markets, which were open 
to participation by broad social strata.1 EMP countries such as England and 
the Netherlands (the focus of the “girlpower” thesis) experienced 
successful economic growth to the extent that they developed and 
maintained such generalized institutions. In other cases, the wider 
                                                 
1 On the distinction between generalized and particularized institutions see Ogilvie 2011, 
pp. 193–94, 428ff, and Ogilvie and Carus 2014, pp. 428–36. 
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institutional framework surrounding the EMP consisted of “particularized” 
institutions such as closed corporate communities, occupational guilds, 
manorial systems, religious bodies, and absolutist states, which allocated 
resources inefficiently and excluded many people from full economic 
participation. EMP countries such as Germany, Austria, Switzerland, 
Bohemia, and Sweden, where particularized institutions were entrenched, 
suffered from low per capita incomes and slow economic growth. We do 
not dispute that institutions affect economic performance, but point out 
theoretical and empirical reasons for focussing on the wider framework of 
nonfamilial institutions, not the EMP, as the key institutional influence on 
European growth.  
WOMEN’S POSITION 
CPZM argue that we place insufficient emphasis on the importance 
of female autonomy for economic growth. They maintain that the EMP 
was critical to the emergence of female agency, which in turn benefited the 
economy. While we agree that female autonomy benefits economic growth 
(Ogilvie and Edwards 2000; Ogilvie 2003; Dennison 2011a; Dennison and 
Ogilvie 2014, p. 676), we found no evidence that the EMP was either 
necessary or sufficient for creating female autonomy (Dennison and 
Ogilvie 2014, pp. 672–76). Quantitative indicators of women’s agency 
such as female household headship, female labor force participation, and 
female wage rates were not uniformly high in EMP societies or uniformly 
low in non-EMP societies. More qualitative indicators of women’s 
position, including property rights, inheritance, and credit market 
participation, point in the same direction. Devising rigorous qualitative 
indicators of female autonomy that are comparable across societies is a 
challenge for future research.  
Women had a good economic position in some societies with the 
EMP, notably England and the Netherlands, but these countries were also 
distinctive in their per capita incomes, relative factor prices, resource 
endowments, geopolitical position, commercial participation, 
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parliamentary governments, legal systems, credit markets, and early 
liberalization of corporative, communal, and seigneurial institutions—all 
variables which have been ascribed a causal role in enhancing female 
autonomy and economic growth. Moreover, women had a much worse 
position in a number of societies in nordic, central, and eastern-central 
Europe where the EMP prevailed to an equal or greater degree (Dennison 
and Ogilvie 2014, pp. 673–74). To explain English and Dutch 
distinctiveness in female autonomy and economic performance, one cannot 
invoke the EMP, which England and the Netherlands shared with many 
other societies where women were more thoroughly excluded from 
economic participation and economic growth was slow.  
The research studies we referred to in our article indicate that both 
women’s position and economic growth were strongly influenced by other 
institutions, regardless of marriage or family pattern (Dennison and Ogilvie 
2014, pp. 674–76). This is consistent with our more general emphasis on 
the importance of the wider institutional framework for both female agency 
and economic growth. Craft guilds excluded women from vocational 
training and employment in Italy and Spain (in the absence of the EMP) 
and in Germany and Sweden (in its presence). Village communities 
restricted women’s market participation in Russia (outside the EMP) and in 
Germany and Bohemia (where the EMP prevailed). The presence of the 
EMP did not prevent female household headship from being restricted by 
manorial institutions in Bohemia, and the absence of the EMP did not deter 
manorial institutions from permitting high female headship in Russia, 
where it suited landlords’ interests. It was not the EMP but rather 
nonfamilial institutions—guilds, communities, serfdom, and many more—
that influenced the extent to which women could obtain vocational 
training, head independent households, supply and employ labor, offer and 
obtain credit, buy, sell and rent land, and transact in product markets. 
These institutions, not the family system, determined whether women 
made a full contribution to the economy, whether markets worked well, 
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whether resources were allocated efficiently, and whether the economy 
grew successfully. 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEMOGRAPHY AND THE 
ECONOMY 
CPZM argue that the EMP should not be measured in terms of 
“levels” of demographic statistics, such as marriage age. Instead, they 
contend, it should be assessed in terms of “a dynamic system,” which they 
define in terms of cultural norms, female agency, and demographic 
responsiveness to economic circumstances. Redefining the EMP in this 
way, they argue, can explain why fast-growing England and the 
Netherlands did not, in fact, manifest the most “pure” or “extreme” variant 
of the EMP as had originally been contended (De Moor and van Zanden 
2010, p. 4; Voigtländer and Voth 2006, pp. 323, 348). CPZM argue that 
England and the Netherlands failed to manifest the EMP in extreme form 
because English and Dutch people responded to successful economic 
growth by reducing their marriage age.  
It is important to adopt a clear definition of the phenomenon to be 
investigated and to identify measurable indicators for that phenomenon. 
Fortunately, historical demographers have done precisely this for the EMP, 
and we use that generally accepted definition and the measurable indicators 
associated with it. We do not focus solely on marriage age, as CPZM claim 
in their abstract, but analyze three separate demographic indicators: female 
age at first marriage, female lifetime celibacy, and nuclear-family 
household structure (Dennison and Ogilvie 2014, pp. 653–72). These 
measurable indicators constitute the mainstream definition of the EMP (see 
Hajnal 1982) and were previously accepted by the authors of the CPZM 
note (e.g., De Moor and van Zanden 2010, pp. 2, 7, 9, 17–19, 23). In 
addition, we analyze the mechanisms through which the EMP is argued to 
have caused economic growth, including the female agency, cultural 
norms, and demographic responsiveness invoked in CPZM’s proposed 
redefinition (Dennison and Ogilvie 2014, pp. 672–84). 
Institutions, Demography, and Economic Growth  7 
As just noted, there is no empirical support for the view that the 
EMP endowed women with a uniquely favorable economic position. 
Neither quantitative nor qualitative indicators of female agency were 
uniformly high in EMP societies or uniformly low in non-EMP societies 
(Dennison and Ogilvie 2014, pp. 672–76). Longitudinal evidence on 
English women’s wages also casts doubt on a “girl-powered” economic 
breakthrough (Humphries and Weisdorf 2015). No rigorous measure of 
women’s economic position supports the view that being characterized by 
the EMP enabled societies to achieve a distinctive degree of female 
agency.  
We also examined the claim that societies with the EMP exhibited 
distinctive, growth-inducing norms and values (Dennison and Ogilvie 
2014, pp. 683–85). We find no empirical support for the notion that either 
the EMP or economic growth was caused by specificities of English 
culture or Weberian Protestantism. Nor is there evidence for the 
proposition advanced by CPZM that medieval Christian dogma created 
cultural norms of consensual marriage that influenced demographic 
behavior. In fact, studies of the practical implementation of medieval 
ecclesiastical provisions concerning demographic behavior strongly 
emphasize the role played by underlying nonfamilial social institutions 
including property rights and legal systems. Associating the EMP with 
medieval Christian dogma is also problematic given that marriage and 
other familial practices varied enormously across Christian Europe and that 
the EMP was not the prevalent familial institution in those societies, such 
as Italy and Iberia, where the influence of the church was strongest 
(Dennison and Ogilvie 2014, pp. 684–85). The distribution of European 
marriage patterns that emerges from empirical research, is not consistent 
with any notion that distinctive cultural norms determined either 
demographic behavior or economic growth. 
The third component of CPZM’s proposed redefinition of the EMP 
is the degree to which demographic behavior responds to economic 
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circumstances. CPZM reiterate a claim advanced in some recent literature 
(and addressed in our article) that economies such as those of England and 
the Netherlands grew faster because the EMP made their demographic 
behavior particularly responsive to economic conditions (e.g., Voigtländer 
and Voth 2006; De Moor and van Zanden 2010). The elasticity of marriage 
and fertility with respect to economic signals does lend itself to empirical 
measurement and has generated a substantial literature (surveyed in 
Dennison and Ogilvie 2014, pp. 680–83). Our exploration of this literature 
found that demographic responsiveness to economic conditions did not 
depend on the EMP, since it was observed historically in societies as 
diverse as northern Italy and China, in which the EMP did not prevail. Nor 
was demographic responsiveness to economic conditions only found in 
successfully growing economies. In fact, it turns out to have been less 
pronounced in England than in a number of slower-growing European 
economies (Dennison and Ogilvie 2014, pp. 680–83). The gap in economic 
performance between England and other European (and non-European) 
societies cannot, therefore, be attributed to the EMP or to the way it may 
have mediated demographic responses to economic circumstances. 
Abandoning the original claim that the EMP prevailed in its most 
“pure” form in England and the Netherlands, powering those countries’ 
successful economic growth (De Moor and van Zanden 2010, p. 4), CPZM 
speculate that England and the Netherlands manifested a moderate form of 
the EMP precisely because their successful economic growth encouraged 
people to marry earlier. However, this reformulation of the EMP theory of 
European economic growth must also be treated with caution.  
For the EMP to have “played a fundamental role in western 
Europe’s economic development” (De Moor and van Zanden 2010, p. 1), 
fast-growing England and the Netherlands would have to have had a 
particularly extreme version of the EMP at some period. This period must 
lie some time before the early to mid-sixteenth century when our empirical 
analysis starts, by which point the data already reveal England and the 
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Netherlands to have had a moderate form of the EMP. Very little is known 
about European marriage patterns before c. 1530 due to the lack of parish 
registers and village censuses which are required to calculate reliable 
statistics on marriage age, lifetime celibacy, and household structure. The 
few available data are insufficient to sustain the proposition that the 
Netherlands and England were demographically distinctive. Scattered and 
heavily debated observations have suggested a female marriage age of c. 
20 for various localities in late medieval Europe, including Holland, 
England, Germany, southern France, and northern Italy (Smith 1979, pp. 
77, 81; Dubois 1997, pp. 211, 214; Emigh 1997, pp. 625–26; Kowaleski 
1999, pp. 326–28; Viazzo 2003, p. 133; Dalla-Zuanna et al. 2012, pp. 294, 
296). Ascribing a marriage age of c. 20 in England and the Netherlands to 
rapid economic growth caused by the norms of the EMP, while ascribing 
the same marriage age in southern France or northern Italy to non-EMP 
norms of non-consensual marriage and female disempowerment, risks 
rendering the EMP theory of economic growth non-falsifiable. 
A second problem is that the scattered data from the pre-parish-
register era include statistics suggesting demographic behavior consistent 
with the EMP in medieval societies outside England and the Netherlands 
that were not characterized by notable economic growth. One study 
suggests a high lifetime celibacy rate in medieval northern France (Hallam 
1985, p. 56), while another finds a high percentage of nuclear-family 
households in medieval Germany (Hammer 1983, p. 244). To the extent 
that any demographic statistics before 1500 can be relied upon, these 
would suggest that the EMP already prevailed in parts of Europe in the 
absence of significant economic growth. Conversely, some of the most 
reliable demographic statistics for Europe before 1500 come from northern 
Italy, which had the most successful and fastest-growing economy in 
medieval Europe, but also had a non-EMP demographic system 
characterized by early female marriage, low lifetime celibacy, and complex 
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households (Smith 1979, p. 77; Kowaleski 1999, pp. 326–28; Dalla-
Zuanna et al. 2012, pp. 294, 296).  
In assessing the plausibility of the idea that an economic-growth-
induced moderation in English and Dutch marriage ages occurred just at 
the point at which each country emerged into empirical observability, one 
must also bear in mind that economic growth can exert countervailing 
income and substitution effects on marriage behavior (Dennison and 
Ogilvie 2013, p. 20). A rise in wages increases incomes, encouraging 
people to consume more of all goods, including marriage, thereby reducing 
marriage age and celibacy. But a wage rise will also increase the 
opportunity cost of withdrawing from the labor force, reducing women’s 
incentives to marry, thereby increasing marriage age and celibacy. The 
whole EMP theory of economic growth is based on the idea that a rise in 
women’s wages after the Black Death gave rise to later and non-universal 
marriage: it thus relies on the assumption that the substitution effect 
dominated the income effect. But CPZM’s attempt to use rising wages to 
explain away the moderateness of English and Dutch marriage behavior 
relies on the opposite assumption, that the income effect dominated the 
substitution effect. Theoretically, the relative size of the income and 
substitution effects could have changed between the Black Death and the 
sixteenth century, but there is no evidence that any such change occurred. 
Seeking to explain away moderate English and Dutch marriage behavior by 
adducing a change in the relative magnitudes of the income and 
substitution effects for which there is no actual evidence again risks 
rendering the EMP theory of economic growth unfalsifiable. Note that if 
the substitution effect was the dominant one, economic growth would have 
encouraged people to marry later, not earlier, thus making CPZM’s claim 
that the moderate form of the EMP observed in England and the 
Netherlands is the consequence of the effect of rising wages on marriage 
behavior impossible to sustain. 
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In so far as pre-parish-register data allow us to reach any 
conclusions, they indicate that economic growth occurred in EMP and non-
EMP societies alike and that manifestations of the EMP prevailed in fast- 
and slow-growing economies alike. There is no evidence that the net effect 
of rising wages on marriage behavior switched from a dominant 
substitution effect to a dominant income effect just before Dutch and 
English demography become observable in the early sixteenth century. 
Furthermore, even once the Dutch and English economies started to grow, 
there is no evidence that this growth was caused by the EMP rather than by 
the many other features of these societies that have been emphasized by 
economic historians. These considerations make it highly unlikely that the 
moderate demographic behavior observed in England and the Netherlands 
as soon as reliable data become available can be ascribed to their having 
enjoyed a spurt of EMP-caused economic growth at an unobservable 
earlier period. 
The theory that the EMP played a fundamental causal role in 
European economic growth suffers, finally, from the pervasive endogeneity 
among all the variables (Dennison and Ogilvie 2014, pp. 672–73, 677, 
680). As soon as one acknowledges that demographic behavior interacts 
with economic conditions, one has to recognize the possibility that 
causality may run not just from the EMP to economic growth but also from 
economic conditions to demographic behavior, and that both economic 
growth and demographic behavior may be influenced by some set of 
underlying factors. The endogeneity of demographic and economic 
behavior is an important point, and its recognition by CPZM is a welcome 
development, but it only reinforces our argument that the EMP was not the 
cause of European economic growth. 
DATA ON EUROPEAN DEMOGRAPHIC BEHAVIOR 
CPZM express puzzlement about certain aspects of our empirical 
analysis. Their first concern is that we did not use the raw data hosted on 
the Mosaic, NAPP, IPUMS, and EHPS websites. Our article made clear, 
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however, that we were analyzing statistics calculated by historical 
demographers (Dennison and Ogilvie 2014, pp. 653–58 and Online 
Appendix). We deliberately refrained from analyzing raw data. Generating 
statistics on marriage age, lifetime celibacy, and household structure from 
raw data in censuses, parish registers, and other primary sources requires 
months, often years, of rigorous analysis by researchers familiar with the 
sources, historical period, and underlying society. To calculate marriage 
age and lifetime celibacy for even one community typically requires 
undertaking the exceptionally labor-intensive project of a family 
reconstitution (Henry and Fleury 1956; Wrigley 1966). To obtain just one 
statistic on household complexity, singulate mean age of marriage, or age-
specific celibacy for one community at one date requires analyzing an 
entire census-type listing (Laslett and Wall 1972). To aggregate raw data 
from such disparate and non-homogeneous sources would have defeated 
our purpose, which was to aggregate findings. 
Furthermore, our 2014 article incorporated only statistical findings 
derived from studies in which the sources and methods had been subjected 
to some degree of peer review.2 Restricting our data compilation to 
secondary studies made it possible to maintain data quality without 
seriously diminishing data quantity. We were able to assemble 4,705 
demographic observations, an order of magnitude larger than any previous 
compilation (Dennison and Ogilvie 2014, pp. 653–58 and Online 
Appendix). 
CPZM also note differences between our 2013 working paper and 
our 2014 article, and express concern that our data set contains relatively 
few observations for some countries. The basic difference between the two 
papers is that the published article included nearly 2,000 more observations 
than the working paper. The size of the data set under analysis is clearly 
described in both papers (Dennison and Ogilvie 2013, pp. 4–16 with 
                                                 
2 Even then, we were careful to control for potential distortion arising from possible 
differences in peer reviewing among different types of scholarly dissemination (Dennison 
and Ogilvie 2014, pp. 657–58). 
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Tables 1–3; Dennison and Ogilvie 2014, pp. 653–58 with Table 1). Our 
2013 working paper was based on 175 research studies, from which we 
compiled a total of 2,731 observations of demographic behavior in 32 
different European countries, 1,491 on female age at first marriage, 709 on 
female lifetime celibacy, and 531 on household structure. Our 2014 article 
substantially expanded this database by extracting data from 365 research 
studies in total, yielding 4,705 observations on demographic behavior in 39 
different countries: 2,622 on women’s age at first marriage, 1,172 on 
female lifetime celibacy, and 911 on household structure.  
Both data sets revealed the same empirical patterns: the most 
“pure” or “extreme” manifestations of the EMP are not to be found in fast-
growing economies such as England and the Netherlands (as claimed in De 
Moor and van Zanden 2010, p. 4; Voigtländer and Voth 2006, pp. 323, 
348). Rather, they were observed in poorer and slower-growing economies 
in nordic, central, and eastern-central Europe (Dennison and Ogilvie 2014, 
pp. 659–72). In a Borda ranking of 30 European countries according to 
extremeness of the EMP, England lay about one-quarter of the way down 
the ranking and the Netherlands two-fifths of the way. Slow-growing 
economies such as Austria, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, 
Sweden, and Bohemia under serfdom showed significantly more extreme 
manifestations of the EMP than fast-growing England and the Netherlands. 
There are, of course, some countries in our data set for which there 
are comparatively few observations, largely because of the lack of 
demographic research on those societies. However, the whole point of 
carrying out an econometric analysis and undertaking statistical 
hypothesis-testing is to assess the probability that a difference between two 
countries is not simply the result of sampling variation. If the number of 
observations were so small as to make it probable that apparent differences 
between countries merely resulted from sampling variation, then the 
hypothesis tests reported in our article would have shown that. Our analysis 
demonstrates that this is not the case. Thus we show that female marriage 
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age in (fast-growing) England was lower than that of 11 (slower-growing) 
countries, and we test the null hypothesis that there is no difference 
between England and each of these countries. The value of the statistic 
used for this hypothesis test takes account of (inter alia) the number of 
observations available for the relevant countries. The null hypothesis of no 
difference between England and each of these countries is rejected, the 
probability that the null hypothesis is true being less than 5 percent. The 
Netherlands had female marriage age lower than much poorer and slower-
growing Denmark and Sweden. The null hypothesis of no difference 
between these countries is again rejected: its probability of being true is 
less than 5 percent (Dennison and Ogilvie 2014, pp. 660–64). Female 
lifetime celibacy, likewise, was higher in 11 other (slower-growing) 
European countries than it was in England and higher in 12 other countries 
than it was in the Netherlands (Dennison and Ogilvie 2014, pp. 664–66). 
Similar statistical findings emerge from our analysis of household 
complexity (Dennison and Ogilvie 2014, pp. 666–69). 
CPZM point out that our data set contains relatively few 
observations for Croatia, Belarus, the Baltic societies, Iceland, Malta, 
Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. On the other hand, our 
analysis was based on 617 observations for Germany, 365 for England, 356 
for northern France, 266 for the Netherlands, 220 for Belgium, 170 for 
Bohemia, 82 for Austria, 61 for Switzerland, 137 for Sweden, and 244 for 
the other four Scandinavian countries taken together. Obtaining more 
observations on the under-researched societies listed above would not 
reverse the finding that the most extreme manifestations of the EMP were 
to be found in slow-growing economies in Scandinavia and German-
speaking central Europe, and that the fast-growing English and Dutch 
economies were characterized by moderate demographic patterns. 
Certainly more data are always desirable, and one aim of our work was to 
stimulate additional research in historical demography. Such studies are 
needed not only for the under-researched parts of Europe, but also for other 
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continents, especially given claims that the EMP also caused economic 
divergence between China and Europe (Voigtländer and Voth 2006; De 
Moor and van Zanden 2010). It is unlikely, however, that collecting more 
data will do anything but reinforce the conclusion that the most extreme 
manifestations of the EMP in early modern Europe were not associated 
with rapid economic growth while the most successful European 
economies manifested a moderate demographic pattern. 
CONCLUSION 
The relationship between institutions, demography, and economic 
decisions can certainly cast light on long-term economic growth. However, 
it is important to recognize the problem of endogeneity and carefully 
analyze causal links. The arguments advanced in CPZM’s comment on our 
article cannot be sustained. Recent literature putting the EMP at the heart of 
economic growth focuses primarily on England and the Netherlands. But 
these two countries did not have an extreme version of the EMP, although 
they were distinctive in other respects, notably in having more 
“generalized” institutions. The most extreme manifestations of the EMP 
prevailed in slow-growing economies such as those in central and nordic 
Europe, where “particularized” institutions predominated and per capita 
incomes remained low. No redefinition of the EMP can alter this finding. 
Women’s autonomy and well-functioning market institutions certainly 
benefited economic growth, but it was the wider framework of nonfamilial 
institutions, not the EMP, that determined whether all economic agents 
(including women) could make a full contribution to the economy, whether 
markets worked well, and whether the economy grew successfully. 
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